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Abstract
We establish a natural translation from word rewriting systems to
strictly positive polymodal logics. Thereby, the latter can be considered
as a generalization of the former. As a corollary we obtain examples of
undecidable strictly positive normal modal logics. The translation has its
counterpart on the level of proofs: we formulate a natural deep inference
proof system for strictly positive logics generalizing derivations in word
rewriting systems. We also formulate some open questions related to the
theory of modal companions of superintuitionistic logics that was initiated
by L.L. Maksimova and V.V. Rybakov.
In this note we study the fragment of polymodal logic consisting of impli-
cations of the form A → B, where A and B are formulas built-up from ⊤ and
propositional variables using just ∧ and the diamond modalities. We call such
formulas A and B strictly positive and will often omit the word ‘strictly.’
The interest towards such weak logics independently emerged within two
different disciplines: provability logic and description logic (see [8, 5, 1]). In
both cases, it was observed that the strictly positive language combines sim-
plicity and efficiency while retaining a substantial amount of expressive power
of modal logic. Thus, strictly positive fragments of many standard modal logics
are polytime decidable. The positive fragment of the (Kripke incomplete) poly-
modal provability logic GLP is both polytime decidable and complete w.r.t. a
natural class of finite Kripke frames [5]. The positive variable-free fragment of
this logic gives rise to a natural ordinal notation system up to the ordinal ε0
and allows for a proof-theoretic analysis of Peano arithmetic [1].
In the present paper we study some general questions related to strictly
positive logics. In particular, we establish a link between proof systems for
strictly positive logics and the standard word rewriting (semi-Thue) systems.
∗Steklov Mathematical Institute, RAS; Moscow M.V. Lomonosov State University; Na-
tional Research University Higher School of Economics; email: bekl@mi.ras.ru. Supported
by Russian Foundation for Basic Research project 15–01–09218a and by Presidential council
for support of leading scientific schools.
1
1 Strictly positive logics
Consider a modal language LΣ with propositional variables p, q,. . . , a constant
⊤, conjunction ∧, and a possibly infinite set of symbols Σ = {ai : i ∈ I}
understood as diamond modalities. The family Σ is called the signature of the
language LΣ. Strictly positive formulas (or simply formulas) are built up by
the grammar:
A ::= p | ⊤ | (A ∧B) | aA, where a ∈ Σ.
Sequents are expressions of the form A ⊢ B where A,B are strictly positive
formulas. We present two types of calculi for strictly positive logics: sequent-
style and deep inference-style.
Sequent-style systems for several positive logics have been introduced and
studied in [1, 2]. This was preceded by an equational logic characterizations of
the same logics in [5].
Basic sequent-style system, denoted K+, is given by the following axioms
and rules:
1. A ⊢ A; A ⊢ ⊤; if A ⊢ B and B ⊢ C then A ⊢ C (syllogism);
2. A ∧B ⊢ A; A ∧B ⊢ B; if A ⊢ B and A ⊢ C then A ⊢ B ∧ C;
3. if A ⊢ B then aA ⊢ aB.
It has not been explicitly mentioned but easily follows from the techniques
of [5, 2] that K+ axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of the polymodal
version of basic modal logic K, so we state this result witout proof.
Theorem 1 A sequent A ⊢ B is provable in K+ iff K ⊢ A→ B.
If one wishes, one can adjoin some further axioms to K+, which correspond
to some standard modal logics.
(4) aaA ⊢ aA;
(T) A ⊢ aA;
(5) aA ∧ aB ⊢ a(A ∧ aB).
Let K4+ denote the logic axiomatized over K+ by Axiom (4); S4+ is ax-
iomatized over K+ by (4) and (T ); S5+ is S4+ together with (5).
If L is a logic, we write A ⊢L B for the statement that the sequent A ⊢ B
is provable in L. Formulas A and B are called L-equivalent (written A ∼L B)
if A ⊢L B and B ⊢L A.
The following theorem is obtained by Dashkov [5] (the case K4+) and by
Dashkov and Svyatlovsky (the cases S4+ and S5+), see [11]. The latter pa-
per also gives an infinite though explicit axiomatization of the strictly positive
fragment of the logic K4.3.
Theorem 2 Let L be any of the logics K4, S4, S5. Then L ⊢ A → B iff
A ⊢L+ B.
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Let C[A/p] denote the result of replacing in C all occurrences of a vari-
able p by A. If a logic L contains K+ then ⊢L satisfies the following positive
replacement lemma.
Lemma 1.1 Suppose A ⊢L B, then C[A/p] ⊢L C[B/p], for any C.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. ✷
A positive logic L is called normal if it contains K+ and is closed under the
following substitution rule: if A ⊢L B then A[C/p] ⊢L B[C/p]. It is clear that
all the positive logics considered so far are normal.
2 Modal companions of strictly positive logics
The language of modal logic is obtained from LΣ by adding boolean connectives.
Recall that a modal logic is called normal if it contains basic modal logic K
and is closed under the rules modus ponens, necessitation and substitution.
There is a natural functor associating with each normal modal logic L its
strictly positive fragment P(L) consisting of all sequents A ⊢ B with A,B
strictly positive such that L ⊢ (A → B). Vice versa, to each strictly positive
normal logic P we can associate its modal counterpartM(P ) axiomatized over
K by all the implications A→ B such that A ⊢P B.
We note that both functors preserve inclusion, that is, are monotone. The
following obvious lemma states thatM and P, in fact, form a Galois connection.
Lemma 2.1 For any normal modal logic L and any strictly positive normal
logic P ,
M(P ) ⊆ L ⇐⇒ P ⊆ P(L).
As a standard consequence we obtain that the composite operations MP
and PM are monotone and idempotent on the corresponding classes of logics.
Moreover,
(i) M(P(L)) ⊆ L;
(ii) P ⊆ P(M(P )).
The converse inclusions in (i) and (ii), generally, do not hold. For (i) we can
refer to the results of Dashkov [5]. He has shown that for the standard modal
logic GL of Go¨del and Lo¨b we have P(GL) = K4+. However, by Theorem 2,
M(K4+) = K4 6= GL.
For (ii), let Σ = {✸} and consider the logic P obtained from K+ by adding
the schema ✸A ⊢ A. We claim that
M(P ) ⊢ p ∧✸⊤ → ✸p.
Indeed, substituting ¬p for A we obtain M(P ) ⊢ p → ✷p. Furthermore,
K ⊢ ✸⊤ ∧ ✷p→ ✸p, therefore M(P ) ⊢ p ∧✸⊤ → ✸p.
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On the other hand, p∧✸⊤ 0P ✸p. Consider a Kripke model (W,R, v) where
W = {0, 1} and the only R-related elements are 0R1. We also let v(p) = {0},
and all the other variables are assumed to be false. For every positive formula
A, the set of all the nodes of W where A is true is downward closed. Hence, it
is easy to see that this model is sound for P . However W, 0 2 p ∧✸⊤ → ✸p.
It has to be noted that strictly positive logics not representable as strictly
positive fragments of modal logics naturally occur in the study of reflection prin-
ciples in arithmetic. For example, the system RCω axiomatizing the properties
of uniform reflection principles over Peano arithmetic is of this kind [2].
A modal logic L such that P(L) = P is called a modal companion of a
positive logic P . As we have seen, not every normal positive logic P has a
companion. If it does, then M(P ) is the least modal companion of P in the
sense that M(P ) is contained in any other companion of P . The set of modal
companions of P , if it is not empty, also has maximal elements. This statement
immediately follows from Zorn’s lemma noting that the union of a chain of
modal companions of P is also its modal companion.
The notion of modal companion of a strictly positive logic is parallel to the
one of superintuitionistic logic. The systematic study of maximal and minimal
modal companions of superintuitionistic logics was initiated by Maksimova and
Rybakov [9] and followed by several important results including the Blok–Esakia
theorem (see [3, 7] and also [12] for a recent survey). For normal strictly positive
logics many natural questions regarding modal companions present themselves,
however so far this interesting area has not been really explored. We mention
some such questions here, all of which have well-known answers in the case of
superintuitionistic logics.
Problem 1. Find useful criteria for a normal strictly positive logic P to have
a modal companion. Equivalently, for which strictly positive logics P do
we have P(M(P )) = P?
Problem 2. Are there normal strictly positive logics P , for which there is no
greatest modal companion? Are K+ and K4+ such logics?
Problem 3. Is GL a maximal modal companion of K4+? In fact, except for
the cases where maximal and minimal modal companions coincide, we do
not know any specific examples of maximal modal companions.
Let us also note that modal logics L representable as the least modal com-
panions of strictly positive logics are exactly those axiomatized over K by a
set of strictly positive implications. Hence, if L = M(P ), as a consequence of
Lemma 2.1 we have
L =M(P ) =MPM(P ) =MP(L).
Strictly positive implications are Sahlqvist formulas, therefore such logics enjoy
the nice properties ensured by Sahlqvist theorem, that is, their completeness
with respect to an elementary class of frames and canonicity.
Hence, we obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 3 If L =M(P ), then both P and L are complete w.r.t. an elemen-
tary class of frames. Moreover, they both are valid in the canonical frame for
L.
Obviously, an arbitrary normal strictly positive logic P need not even be
Kripke complete.
3 Strictly positive deep inference calculus
It is natural to axiomatize the consequence relation on LΣ in such a way that
the derived objects are positive formulas and A ⊢ B is understood as provability
of B from hypothesis A.
We postulate the following conjunction introduction and elimination rules:
A
A ∧A
A ∧B
A
A ∧B
B
The rule for ⊤ is just
A
⊤
Notice that all the rules have one premiss. Rules in deep inference calculi
are applied within a context. A context is a strictly positive formula C(p) in
which a variable p occurs only once. Let
A
B
be a rule instance. For any context C(p), we say that C(B) is obtained from
C(A) by a rule application. A derivation is a sequence of formulas in which
every member, except for the first one, is obtained from the previous one by a
rule application.
Let L be a normal positive logic given by a set S of sequents (schemata) over
K+. We can naturally associate with L its deep inference version LD where,
in addition to the above mentioned rules for ∧ and ⊤, for every axiom-sequent
A ⊢ B from S a rule
A
B
in LD is postulated.
We note the following property of LD.
Lemma 3.1 If A ⊢LD B then C(A) ⊢LD C(B), for any context C.
Proof. Obvious induction on the length of the derivation A ⊢LD B using the
fact that if C1(p), C2(p) are contexts then so is C1(C2(p)). ✷
Theorem 4 A ⊢L B iff B is provable from A in LD.
Proof. Both implications are established by induction on the number of rule
applications in the corresponding derivation.
(⇐) Assume B is provable from A in LD and consider the last rule appli-
cation
B
B′
in this derivation. By the induction hypothesis A ⊢L B
′. There is
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a context C(p) such that B = C(B′′), B′ = C(A′′) and
B′′
A′′
is an instance of a
postulated rule of LD. Thus, we obtain A
′′ ⊢L B
′′ and by positive replacement
B′ = C(A′′) ⊢L C(B
′′) = B. By the transitivity rule A ⊢L B.
For the (⇒) we note that the syllogism rule corresponds to the composition
of derivations. The conjunction elimination axioms match the corresponding
rules.
To treat the conjunction introduction rule assume C ⊢L A and C ⊢L B.
By the IH we have LD derivations of A from C and of B from C. Lemma 3.1
yields derivations of A ∧ C from C ∧ C and of A ∧ B from A ∧ C. Hence, we
can derive in LD: C, C ∧ C, . . . , A ∧ C, . . . , A ∧B, as required.
The modal rule is also interpreted by putting a deep inference proof within
a context. If there is an LD proof of B from A, then by Lemma 3.1 there is a
proof of aB from aA. ✷
Notice that this yields deep inference systems for K+, K4+, S4+ and S5+.
4 Word rewriting systems
A word rewriting system over an alphabet Σ is given by a set of rules of the
form A 7→ B where A,B are words in Σ. Such systems are also known as
semi–Thue systems (see [6, Chapter 7]). A rule application is a substitution of
an occurrence of A in any word by B:
XAY → XBY.
A derivation in a system R is a sequence of words in which every member is
obtained from the previous one by an application of one of the rules of R. We
write A ։R B iff there is a derivation of B from A in R (the subscript R is
omitted if understood from the context).
It is well-known that finite word rewriting systems (over a finite alphabet
Σ) are a universal model of computation. In particular, there is a finite system
R such that it is undecidable whether a given word B is derivable from a given
word A.
To each word rewriting system R over Σ we associate a normal strictly
positive logic LR in LΣ. LR is obtained fromK
+ by adding the axioms Ap ⊢ Bp,
for each of the rules A 7→ B from R. The words A and B are now understood
as sequences of modalities.
Theorem 5 A։R B iff Ap ⊢LR Bp.
Proof. (only if) We argue by induction on the length of an R-derivation x of
B from A. Basis is easy. Suppose x has the form:
A։ XUY → XV Y = B,
where U 7→ V is a rule from R. By IH we have Ap ⊢LR XUY p. By the LR
axiom we obtain UY p ⊢LR V Y p, and then by positive replacement XUY p ⊢LR
XV Y p. Hence, Ap ⊢LR Bp.
The (if) part is based on the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 4.1 Assume ⊤ does not occur in A,B. If A ⊢LR B then there is a
derivation of B from A in (LR)D in which the ⊤-rule is not applied.
Proof. Induction on the number of applications of the ⊤-rule. Consider any
such application
C(A1)
C(⊤)
The part of the derivation after C(⊤) may contain some occurrences of ⊤ in-
herited from this one. Replacing them all by A1 yields a derivation of B from
C(A1) with the same number of the ⊤-rule applications. Then, the derivation
A, . . . , C(A1), . . . , B has one less application of the ⊤-rule than the original
derivation. ✷
Lemma 4.2 Assume A,B ∈ Σ∗ and Ap ⊢(LR)D Bp. Then there is a derivation
of Bp from Ap in which no conjunction rule is applied.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 we may assume that the ⊤-rule is not applied in the given
derivation. We argue by induction on the number of conjunction introduction
rule applications in the given derivation d. Since the ⊤-rule is not applied in d,
every conjunction occurrence disappears as a result of conjunction elimination
rule application either to itself, or to an external conjunction. Every formula
containing at least one conjunction has the form γ(C1 ∧C2) where γ ∈ Σ
∗ (and
the displayed conjunction is the outermost one).
In all the formulas of the derivation consider the outermost conjunction. No-
tice that at least one outermost conjunction must be introduced in the deriva-
tion (e.g., such is the conjunction introduced first). We select the chronologi-
cally last introduced outermost conjunction. We notice that no conjunction is
introduced outside this one before it is eliminated. Otherwise, the first such
application would introduce an outermost conjunction later than the selected
one. Hence, the selected conjunction has exactly one successor in each step of
the derivation until it disappears as a result of conjunction elimination applied
to itself:
γC, γ(C ∧ C), . . . , δ(C1 ∧ C2), δCi.
Notice that the R-rules do not apply to conjunctions, and the conjunction rules
can only be applied inside the selected conjunction. Therefore, there exist
separate derivations of δ(q) from γ(q), and of each Cj (j ∈ {1, 2}) from C,
respectively. It follows that we can replace this subderivation by
γC, . . . , δC, . . . , δCi,
thus eliminating at least one application of conjunction introduction rule in the
whole derivation. ✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 5 we notice that a deep inference format
LR-derivation of Bp from Ap in which no ⊤-rule and conjunction rules are
applied is essentially an R-derivation of B from A. The only applicable rules
are the R-rules whose effect is exactly that of R-substitutions. ✷
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Corollary 4.3 There is a finitely axiomatizable undecidable strictly positive
logic.
It has to be noted that the finitely axiomatized strictly positive logics that
have naturally occurred so far all are polytime decidable (see [5, 2]).
The results of the last section of this paper have a very close predecessor
in the work of Valentin Shehtman and Alexander Chagrov (see [10, 4]). In
particular, Chagrov and Shehtman exhibit undecidable propositional polymodal
logics whose axioms are given by the implications of the form A → B, where
A and B are sequences of ✷-modalities. Clearly, such logics are the minimal
modal companions of the positive logics we considered in this section. The
authors, however, use semantical rather than syntactical arguments to establish
a correspondence of their logics with the (semi-)Thue systems. In a sense, the
correspondence between strictly positive logics of the considered kind and semi-
Thue systems is even closer than for modal logics, for it extends to the level of
derivations.
We thank anonymous referees for spotting some errors in the previous ver-
sion of the paper and Valentin Shehtman for pointing out a connection with his
work.
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